Skip to main content

13 posts tagged with "observations"

View All Tags

· 4 min read

Predictions of Past and Present

Once in a while it may be nice to let loose with a little silliness. So enjoy this short article on 18th century critical theory and the folly of technological prophesies.

Historicism, that nebulous academic term that finds itself increasingly harder to define the more you delve into it, is at play more than you may think in the ever-changing landscape of web3. A term originally coined by Friedrich Schlegel a couple centuries ago, we will define it– for the purposes of this article– simply as the idea that societies at different times in history can oftentimes lose sight of the fact that time keeps marching forward. The future, it turns out, isn’t the easiest thing to predict. And the present doesn’t offer up all the answers. As much as we may be tempted to feel like we’ve got it all figured out, history has a bad habit of revealing the folly that belies this hubris.

After all, two Romans speaking a couple thousand years ago didn’t ask each other what year it was, only for one to tell the other, “We’re in the year -22 BCE, dummy!”

All this a long-winded way to say: people tend to lose sight of the future, or, to be more precise, never truly have it. Our ability to predict is pathetically unreliable as systems grow more complex. Case in point: computing power has grown exponentially, and yet we are still terrible at predicting weather. You’d think with all our developments we’d be able to see a massive hurricane before it forms, and yet this feat is presently considered functionally impossible.

For all the naysayers out there: criticism of new ideas, technologies and ways of building isn’t too new after all. People have a hard time predicting what will work, but hindsight is 20/20. Enjoy as we pit historical figures, living and otherwise, in a match of predictions in the Premonition Rumble!

JB’s Inaugural Premonition Rumble!

Warren Buffet versus Robert Metcalfe

"In terms of cryptocurrencies generally, I can say almost with certainty that they will come to a bad ending.” - Warren Buffet, 2019


“I predict the Internet will soon go spectacularly supernova and in 1996 catastrophically collapse.” — Robert Metcalfe, founder of 3Com, inventor of Ethernet, 1995

Paul Krugman versus Thomas Edison

“Twelve years on, cryptocurrencies play almost no role in normal economic activity. Almost the only time we hear about them being used as a means of payment -- as opposed to speculative trading -- is in association with illegal activity.” - Paul Krugman, Nobel prize-winning economist, 2021


“Fooling around with alternating current (AC) is just a waste of time. Nobody will use it, ever.” — Thomas Edison, accomplished inventor, 1889

Warren Buffet versus David Sarnoff

"Cryptocurrencies basically have no value and they don't produce anything. They don't reproduce, they can't mail you a check, they can't do anything, and what you hope is that somebody else comes along and pays you more money for them later on, but then that person's got the problem. In terms of value: zero." — Warren Buffet, 2020


“The wireless music box [ie the radio] has no imaginable commercial value. Who would pay for a message sent to no one in particular?” — David Sarnoff, founder of RCA, 1921

Charlie Munger versus Steve Jobs

“I think I should say modestly that the whole damn development [of cryptocurrency] is disgusting and contrary to the interests of civilization.” - Charlie Munger, legendary investor, 2021


“The subscription model of buying music is bankrupt. I think you could make available the Second Coming in a subscription model, and it might not be successful.” — Steve Jobs, 2003

Bill Gates versus himself

“As an asset class, [crypto] is not producing anything and so you shouldn’t expect it to go up. It’s kind of a pure ‘greater fool theory’ type of investment.” - Bill Gates, crypto expert!, 2019


“No one will need more than 637KB of memory for a personal computer. 640KB ought to be enough for anybody.” - Bill Gates, computer expert!, 1981


“Two years from now, spam will be solved.” - Bill Gates, spam expert!, 2004


“I see little commercial potential for the internet for the next 10 years.” - Bill Gates, Nostradamus Incarnate!, 1994

Main takeaways

  • All the radios in the world are kind of just window dressing, I guess
  • Wtf it’s 2022 and Spotify still doesn’t have The Second Coming!?
  • Alternating current is a flex, not the basis for the world’s electrical grid
  • I don’t even know where the fuck you’re reading this, because the internet imploded in 1996


Our competitors fought ferociously— have you been keeping score at home?

· 3 min read

The Cryptovoxels environment from above

A new way to wind down

The DAO space online isn’t like your average experience working at a company or corporation. Unlike the physical environment of offices, cubicles, and maybe the occasional beanbag chair if you happen to work at one of those fun places, the online space where DAOs operate is free from constraints and incentives. It’s a space where people create for the sake of it, and pool effort together as a means of expression. Don’t get me wrong, there are plenty of endeavors out there that seek to make money, but the crucial difference is about what we call the bottom line, and what it looks like in a DAO space versus traditional settings.

Enter Cryptovoxels: an online space where participants can congregate, listen to music together, and even enjoy a “live” show in a virtual environment (pictured above). The Cryptovoxels space isn’t unique for what it is— plenty of paid spaces exist that try to achieve the same goal. The reason Cryptovoxels is unique is precisely for what it isn’t. It’s not about raising money, or pandering to users for shares and likes and what have you. It’s a space to wind down and enjoy together in a uniquely anti-consumerist experience. A space where creatives, programmers, technical writers, holders and any and all between can congregate for the sake of it. A lounge in the Cryptovoxels space

Creating for the sake of it

Spaces like Cryptovoxels are unique because of how they come about. In a traditional work environment or major corporation, somebody at the top may have an idea to create a space such as Cryptovoxels. From there, the idea would distill as it trickled down the workforce, ultimately culminating in strict directives and program managers. In other words, the project would itself become work— anathema to its very purpose!

In the DAOsphere, the whole process is put on its head. Eager community members, excited to contribute to a greater organization, and at times simply wanting to spin their wheels, generate projects such as Cryptovoxels not in order to make money, not in order to boast, not in order to monetize an experience, but, rather, simply to enjoy a moment— a happening, a vibe— with one another in a shared space. Where else can we say that this is the case? A Cryptovoxel room, replete with revolving door and anonymous puppet avatar)

Web 3.0 is a state of mind

The spaces engendered by an overall feeling toward collaboration, decentralization and egalitarian work-force options are encapsulated by Cryptovoxels. They’re spaces that uniquely represent a way of thinking about the world and its members differently than before. They represent an open view of the world that seeks to collaborate into greater and greater projects without, importantly, treating everything in accordance with it’s bottom-line monetary value.

The era of web 3.0 is ushering in a way of thinking inclusively and openly about collaboration unlike anything we’ve seen before. The irony that the same Web 3.0 that brought us NFTs of just about everything can also bring us closer together in a completely non-exploitative way is rich, to be sure. But seeing this irony as a beauty, rather than a contradiction, is probably a better representation of the spirit of our times.

· 2 min read
  • Devs aren't just coders. Anyone who recognizes genuine inefficiencies and makes themself useful toward delivering great solutions is a dev.

filipv, STVG, twodam, zeugh, phytann, sage, mieos, nicholas, zom-bae, mrgoldstein, zhape, westlife29, linywan, peacenode, germs, gulan, and a few other JB friends don't contribute code to the core contracts or site, but they show up to dev everything else they recognize can add value: governance, tools, dev ops, analytics, Banny, cryptovoxels empire, Discord bots, podcasts, translations, education, bookkeeping, support, strategy etc.

  • Devs are individuals, not entities. DAOs, VCs, corporations, campaigns, and projects may have great devs within them, but aren't devs themselves.
  • Devs like to dev with other devs.
  • Devs are often artful.
  • Devs are never zero-sum thinkers.
  • Devs should continue to improve how we build alongside each other at scale and audit each other's work along the way. More agency, less management.
  • Leaders are devs who also delegate effectively between other devs. Any dev can be a leader, the more the merrier.
  • Devs should continue to work towards improving the experience of other devs.
  • Devs who build in the open have leverage.
  • Resources follow devs.
  • Power decentralizes as more people become devs.

· 6 min read

JuiceboxDAO runs its community treasury on the Juicebox protocol. The tools at its disposal are also publicly available. Check out the protocol's tokenomics toolkit here.

JBX is the membership token of JuiceboxDAO. Its utility is to vote on proposals of how the DAO should evolve over time. Check out the potential use cases each project's tokens can be programmed to have within the Juicebox protocol here.

Thanks to Nicholas, Zom-Bae, Zeugh, and Aeolian for edits and feedback.

JuiceboxDAO is currently issuing 208,920 JBX per ETH to anyone who contributes to the treasury. This rate currently decreases by 10% every other week. There is a proposal to push this up to 20%.

At the current redemption bonding curve of 60%, the protocol is offering 1 ETH back from the treasury for each 679,652 JBX burned. There is a proposal to change this rate to 95%, at which the protocol would be offering 1 ETH for about 459,219 JBX burned.

The price of JBX / ETH on Uniswap is currently 446,380 JBX per 1 ETH traded.

JuiceboxDAO currently has a reserved rate of 35%, which means 112,495 new JBX get reserved per ETH contributed to the treasury alongside the amount issued for the contributor. 30% of this goes to the DAO (dao.jbx.eth), 24% to jango.eth, 24% to peri.eth, 7% to nnnnicholas.eth, 7% to exekias.eth, 4% to CanuDAO, and 4% to WAGMI Studios.


  • JBX is currently trading in between the issuance and the burn rates on off-protocol markets such as the Uniswap AMM. There's currently no incentive for anyone to inflate or shrink the JBX supply.

The protocol says nothing about what might happen off-protocol. The following are just my assumptions and not financial advice.  

  • If the market price of JBX increases past the protocol's issuance price, any additional demand of JBX can be fulfilled by contributing ETH to the Juicebox treasury which will in turn mint and distribute JBX.

Risk taking arbitragers might be incentivized to mint extra JBX at this funding cycle's rate to cover the 10% spread that will become available when the cycle rolls over and the discount takes effect. They can also benefit from information asymmetry by minting JBX to fill buy orders on off-protocol markets – the JuiceboxDAO community should work to minimize the opportunity for information asymmetry.

Either of these will benefit all JBX holders who have held their JBX from better rates during previous funding cycles – their share of the total JBX in circulation will shrink, but the ETH treasury that backs each JBX will grow at a faster rate, which has the effect of increasing the burn rate.

  • If the price of JBX decreases past the protocol's burn rate, further demand to sell JBX can be fulfilled by burning JBX to get ETH that is locked in the treasury's overflow.

Again, arbitragers can benefit from information asymmetry by burning JBX to fill sell orders on off-protocol markets – again, the JuiceboxDAO community should work to minimize the opportunity for information asymmetry.

Either of these will benefit all JBX holders who chose to hold their JBX through the sell pressure – every JBX that is redeemed at a redemption bonding curve leaves some ETH on the table from its proportional share (60% curve leaves a lot more on the table for holders than a 95% curve, exaggerating the effect). In all cases except a 100% redemption curve, the JBX circulating supply will be decreasing at a faster rate than the treasury's ETH supply. This will marginally increase the burn rate for JBX with each subsequent burn, which will add upward pressure on prices, shrink supply, and leave only the holders that turned away the potentially mounting exit incentive to keep building.

  • Over time as the market pushes against the issue and burn rates, a JBX holder's burn rate will increase and might eventually exceed the value that the JBX was minted at.

The more pressure on either side, the more the burn rate increases for each holder. On the other hand, the burn rate will stay the same if the market is being satisfied off protocol.

Tail market events benefit JBX holders most, albeit in a contained and measured way. The only thing that does not benefit JBX holders is the lack of change in JBX demand over time. Under this mechanism, it seems we are sacrificing price swings for resiliency.

  • The DAO is spending ETH each funding cycle to pay out contributors, services, and grants as proposals get approved by JBX holders. The impact of this spending is spread across all JBX holders, marginally reducing everyone's burn rate.

The DAO could also allocate ETH off-platform in its multisig wallet or various other contracts across web3. This value is currently impossible to account for in the burn rate given the current version of the Juicebox protocol.

  • The reserved token list only captures value when the token supply is growing. Once token supply has expanded and the market is satisfied off protocol, reserved token holders are massively incentivized to push the price up towards its limit.

  • It is expensive to mint 51% of all tokens in existence, even without a reserved rate. If this were to happen, the ETH used to mint the token majority would immediately fund an increased burn rate for every token holder from previous cycles. The new influential JBX holder would have to appease a community with potentially significant exit incentive.

This same effect exists if the 51% is bought all-of-the-sudden by thousands of uncoordinated people on the internet.

  • The DAO (dao.jbx.eth) currently receives 30% of reserved JBX tokens. The DAO is considering committing a percent of this built up supply to circulate among contributors via the DAO's discord.

It can do so in many ways, one approach is to split the allocation among the addresses on the reserved list, who are then encouraged to split this initial supply entirely between those who they work closest with and who's contributions they want to recognize. Those recipients are in turn encouraged to continue circulating this supply.

The goal is to make sure everyone who is building and maintaining the protocol and ecosystem becomes significant JBX token holders that can formally help the DAO make decisions.

If this internal JBX distribution system increases the governance participation of new builders and of those who steward the protocol, then the DAO may benefit from expanding this program by increasing the portion of reserved tokens allocated to the DAO treasury, and reducing the reserved token allocation to other recipients.

· One min read

Before you start a project on Juicebox V1 or contribute funds to one, understand the following inefficiencies. These are shortcoming of V1 that have imperfect work arounds for now.

  1. There is no pause button. The best you can do is configure the reserves rate to 100% if you do not want to give new contributors any tokens. You can set an address responsible for burning tokens as the reserved token recipient.
  2. When a project's reserved rate starts at 0% and is then reconfigured to be higher than 0%, a new token supply will become available to distribute to the preconfigured reserved token recipients according to the rate chosen. For example, if moved to 100%, the total supply will double. Again, you can set an address responsible for burning tokens as the reserved token recipient.

This inefficiency was discovered on August 18th. Here's more. 3. There is no direct burn transaction, but tokens will be burnt when redeemed. Therefor in order to burn, reconfigure your target such that there is overflow, then redeem tokens and then inject the overflow back into the treasury.

· 2 min read

From the original post:

The simplest option would be to just deploy the same Juicebox protocol in each EVM compatible L2 environment. This forces projects to choose which they would like to operate on, or manage their own complexity if they would like to operate across many. I'm guessing most projects would prefer to operate everywhere, if only it were easy to do so.

What if the simplest option was the best option?

Although deploying the same Juicebox protocol in each EVM compatible L2 environment forces projects to choose which they would like to operate on, it might be most reasonable to pass along this choice and complexity to each project while suggesting thorough operational strategies to weave these isolated environments together at the DAO/social/governance layer.

Here are some potential operational guidelines, using JuiceboxDAO as an example:

  • Juicebox protocol is deployed identically on several L2s and side chains. JuiceboxDAO creates a project on each one where fees will be collected and contributions accepted.
  • JuiceboxDAO will have different tokens on each chain. JuiceboxDAO membership is composed of a strategy that take each of these tokens into account. Members are responsible for managing the entirety of the DAO's treasury across all chains.
  • JuiceboxDAO submits treasury reconfigurations to each chain independently. Each chain can have funding cycles that operate on different schedules, have different token issuance rates, and different ETH distributions. This flexibility can be used to orchestrate arbitrary multi-chain treasury designs, although also introducing management overhead. Extend to new environments responsibly.
  • JuiceboxDAO can move its ETH/tokens between environments adhering to the constraints of each chain, leaning on existing and upcoming generalized bridging infrastructure.
  • It can deploy converter contracts if it wishes to support conversions between each of its membership tokens.

Any other project could choose to operate on one or many environments where the Juicebox protocol has been deployed. If they choose to operate on many, they would have to manage the complexity of doing so. Once projects have begun experimenting and settling on effective patterns, I'd hope a playbook would emerge as a reference for future projects.

Leaving multi-layer coordination for the social layer introduces some operational overhead and risk, but also keeps the protocol layer flexible and simple.

· 2 min read

Projects building on Juicebox need payment terminals that cost its contributors less gas to pay and redeem.

To do so, projects need to be able to accept funds across many different L2s alongside mainnet.

The simplest option would be to just deploy the same Juicebox protocol in each EVM compatible L2 environment. This forces projects to choose which they would like to operate on, or manage their own complexity if they would like to operate across many. I'm guessing most projects would prefer to operate everywhere, if only it were easy to do so.

JuiceboxDAO runs on the juicebox protocol itself, if we do nothing at the protocol layer and go with this simple option we will come across the same dilemma. If instead we preemptively consider how we can adjust the Juicebox V2 protocol to make cross layer operation simple for us, we'll likely also be making it simple for all projects who choose to build around juicebox treasuries.

An effective solution will take into consideration that:

  • projects do not want to fragment its community and governance across chains. All members should be cheering for funds to come in from wherever people care to contribute from, and the project's distributed tokens in turn should provide the opportunity to govern its cumulative funds regardless of what chain they're on.
  • the issuance rate of the project's tokens should be synchronizable across all available environments over time. As funding cycles roll over, it's often the case that the weight of token distribution changes. Unless it is by design, there shouldn't be arbitrage opportunities across chains.
  • funding cycle reconfigurations should either be approved or fail across all environments. If a project proposes to reconfigure its funding parameters in one environment but the ballot to do so ends up failing, the change should also fail to take effect in all other environments. On the flip side, successful funding cycle reconfigurations should be reflected across chains.

Stay tuned for specific proposals from me of how this might be achieve across rollup L2s, and please contribute to the conversation with your own ideas so we can arrive at the best possible set of solutions together.

· 6 min read

thoughts in progress. feedback always welcome. plz add to the conversation and let me know if i'm missing some context, it can be hard to keep up with it all.

ConstitutionDAO has reached some sort of a coordination moment. There are decisions to be made both technically and socially, and the PEOPLE will have their first opportunity to really use their voice.

Meanwhile us builders have another opportunity to evaluate and extend our current tooling to best support moments like this for people into the future.

Things we care about when considering refund design: speed, safety, cost, flexibility, convenience, (...?).

In the case of ConstitutionDAO, the refund could be handled in a few different ways (there are definitely others that I don't know of or am less familiar with):

Do it through Juicebox


  1. Inject the $40+ million back into the Juicebox contract.
  2. Multisig sends a tx reconfiguring ConstitutionDAO's funding cycle target to 0, allowing all tokens to be redeemable for a proportional share of all funds in the treasury.
  3. Everyone who wants to redeem their PEOPLE tokens can do so. All who wish to stay in and build out ConstitutionDAO can instead keep their PEOPLE tokens and leave their funds committed to the group.
  4. The DAO eventually reassess what it wants out of itself, and who will serve on the multisig to continuing operating the treasury on the community's behalf. DAO can also reassess if it wishes to open up to new members and contributions, etc. In other words, DAO continues to do DAO shit.


  • -- I'd prefer if the Juicebox contracts were looked through by several more people before sticking $40+ mil in them. I personally trust them, but we need community trust and acknowledgement that this is risky experimental stuff. I would love to have the community's confidence in this decision. I'd love to do workshops over the next few days toward this end.
  • -- Every person claiming would have a gas fee to pay that would cost about the same as it costed them to contribute: $30-$60 bucks worth of ETH. This sucks especially for folks who contributed amounts around the same order of magnitude as the fee.
  • ++ This would require minimal coordination, everyone can take whatever action they choose, whenever they choose to.
  • ++ As the Juicebox process is being audited, the DAO could begin manually issuing refunds right away to people who send in their PEOPLE tokens to the multisig.

Multisig manually sends refunds to those who want it

I saw versions of this idea from @strangechances, @DennisonBertram, and @austingriffith.


  1. DAO reserves around $2 mil to pay for refund gas.
  2. Take a snapshot. Everyone who had a balance of PEOPLE tokens at a particular block number would be eligible to request a refund at a rate of 1 ETH per 1,000,000 tokens.
  3. The multisig would send tx's to fulfill these requests, covering the gas using the amount reserved.
  4. The remaining DAO has to reassess how it manages its tokens if it wants to continue to do DAO shit since PEOPLE tokens are no longer backed by ETH.


  • -- multisig would have to coordinate around potentially thousands of payments.
  • -- it could take a bit for people to signal their request for a refund. The multisig would have a lot of double-checking and button-clicking to do upfront, and be on standby for a while.
  • -- the balances won't account for exchanges that happened after the snapshot.
  • ++ The cost of gas will be distributed between everyone who stays around. They DAO could even retroactively subsidize the entry gas fee of anyone leaving by issuing refunds ~$60 more than what was contributed, assuming there is a sizable enough community who wants to hold on to their PEOPLE tokens.
  • ++ People can have the option to request funds on a particular L2. The multisig can batch transfer its balance to each L2 accordingly and issue distributions from there.

Multisig deploys a Merkle Distributor airdrop

Comment from @nnnnicholas. Disclosure: Nicholas is not a member-donor of ConstitutionDAO. It was also mentioned @austingriffith.

A version of this using Mirror Splits was proposed by @strangechances who offered to help execute it.


  1. Take a snapshot. Everyone who had a balance of PEOPLE tokens at a particular block number would be eligible to request a refund at a rate of 1 ETH per 1,000,000 tokens. This is called a "snapshot".
  2. Deploy Airdrop/Split contract and send it total funds.
  3. Announce timeline for moving funds back to DAO treasury multisig to be claimed by those addresses captured in the snapshot.
  4. The remaining DAO has to reassess how it manages its tokens if it wants to continue to do DAO shit since PEOPLE tokens are no longer backed by ETH.


  • -- This approach will still cost refunders a similar amount of gas to redeeming via Juicebox.
  • -- The PEOPLE tokens can no longer be used as a claim on the treasury, because people could then double-dip. PEOPLE tokens no longer function as normal Juicebox project tokens.
  • ++ The primary advantages of the airdrop approach is that it can use all or mostly audited code, increasing security as compared to Juicebox's unaudited redemption mechanism.
  • ++ This approach reduces gas costs for the DAO (i.e., the people who do not want refunds) as compared to multisig paying gas to send all refunds directly.
  • ++ The airdrop could be configured to allow redemptions on an L2, though this adds complexity.
  • ++ Allows contributors to retain their PEOPLE token but receive a refund.

... (pitch other ideas by listing steps and tradeoffs)

General notes:

  • Anyone whose contribution to ConstitutionDAO settled after the PEOPLE token distribution cutoff will be receiving a direct refund from the DAO.
  • The timing of the snapshot becomes very important in the scenarios that require one. Candidates include the time the Juicebox closed to new contributions, the moment the auction was lost, or some point in the future (i.e., pre-announced snapshot).  
  • Snapshots are captured using a Merkle tree that can be stored in an offchain database or IPFS as in Mirror's Split, which is based on Uniswap's UNI airdop Merkle-Distributor, or emitted as an onchain event stendhal-labs/collab-splitter. The latter would likely be expensive, but far less so than the DAO paying to distribute the refunds manually.

· 4 min read

JBX membership is currently represented by 602,065,173 tokens:

Jango has 118,891,959 (19.74%) Peri has 100,255,206 (16.65%) DragonFly Capital has 48,048,000 (7.98%) SharkDAO has 30,063,667 (4.99%) JuiceboxDAO has 27,827,807 (4.62%) 4 addresses each have around 18,500,000 (3%) 13 addresses have between 5,000,000 - 15,000,000 (1-3%) 7 addresses have between 2,500,000 - 5,000,000 (0.5-1%) 28 addresses have between 500,000 - 5,000,000 (0.1-0.5%) 64 addresses have between 100,000 - 500,000 (0.01-0.1%) 56 addresses have less than 0.01%

Membership has been given to those who have helped build the protocol and the DAO, and to those who have supported the efforts by sending ETH to the treasury, with a preference for those who helped in any capacity in earlier funding cycles. Membership has been open to all since the protocol was deployed.

Currently in Funding Cycle #8, each 10 ETH contributed to the treasury by new or existing members mints the following amounts of JBX:

2,579,260 for the contributing member

416,649 for JuiceboxDAO 333,319 for Peri 333,319 for Jango 97,218 for Nicholas 97,218 for Exekias 55,553 for WAGMI Studios 55,553 for CanuDAO

Today, it would take a contribution of 278 ETH for the contributing member to get 10% of the total membership tokens.

Two months ago in funding cycle #4, each 10 ETH contributed to the treasury minted 3,931,200 JBX for the member.

The total amount of JBX issued to members per ETH accepted is decreasing by 10% every 2 weeks. At this current rate with 2 week funding cycles and 35% reserved, in funding cycle #12 each 10 ETH contributed to the treasury will only mint 1,692,252 JBX for the contributor.


  • Builders and contributors don't know what they're getting when they contribute ETH or are receivers of reserved tokens.
  • Membership is getting expensive.
  • JBDAOs strategy thus far has been to focus on building in the open, while making clear upfront the resources it needs to be able to build effectively.
  • No one in JBDAO has produced much work proposing how we might make membership more accessible to people or distribute it more widely, or why that might be worth prioritizing. Most of what is discussed is about how to solve problems for juicebox projects and for builders who want to come in and improve/grow the ecosystem.
  • The way JBDAO is using its 35% reserved rate ensures about 25% of any membership expansion the DAO makes goes to builders who are currently stewarding projects. If the DAO isn't growing its treasury, committed builders don't become substantial members. The remaining 10% go to JBDAO itself, which it hasn't done anything with yet.
  • The DAO's casual builders and helpers currently don't have a way to become members other than to make a contribution to the DAO of any amount.
  • It might be interesting for the DAO to tapper off its discount rate so that over time, members who consider joining are represented and feel welcome.
  • It might be interesting for the DAO to allocate all of a 35% reserved rate to itself so it can hand out some non-insignificant starter membership amounts to more people who are helping out casually, and to people who are currently cranking out tasks and getting to know the system but don't yet plan on sticking around for too long. The DAO could also give membership to other builders around web3 who might be creative and thoughtful voices to have in the room when determining how the DAO could allocate its treasury.

Open questions

  • How might the DAO distribute its allocation of JBX effectively to add more great members now and into the future?

· 3 min read

As funds are contributed to the JuiceboxDAO treasury – either as direct payments or as fees paid – JBX is minted and distributed. Currently, 35% of these are reserved and allocated to preprogrammed addresses while the remaining 65% are sent to the contributor of the payment.

The current distribution of reserved tokens for JuiceboxDAO is as follows: There is no cap to how many JBX are minted into existence: as more ETH is contributed, more JBX is created, albeit at a slightly decreasing rate over time due to the discount rate (currently 10% fewer JBX minted per ETH every 2 weeks). With each payment, the pie being shared grows while everyone's share of the pie slightly shrinks.

... except for those on the reserved tokens list. At any given moment, their overall JBX positions tend towards the percent of reserved tokens they're programmed to receive, at the rate of the treasury's growth. This also means that currently 35% of the DAO's value tends to concentrate between the reserved token holders, with the remaining 65% going to a long-tail distribution between those who chipped in or paid fees to the treasury over time, favoring those who did so soonest.

JuiceboxDAO's reserved tokens have thus far been mostly allocated to those few contributors shouldering operational responsibilities to the DAO. Recently the DAO also began reserving tokens for the DAO's multi-sig in order to redistribute to LP staking rewards and other programs.

Going forward, the DAO's greatest opportunity to coordinate incentives among its community will likely come through expanding the reserved pool to include many new members and campaigns with proven commitments to its success, as well as smaller scoped experimental distributions.

With a few basic guardrails and guidances in place such as those outlined in the DAO's governance documents, the DAO should be set up to fairly and efficiently welcome in meaningful contributors, while shedding those who are no longer participating or useful. This process should spread the value the DAO creates to the people actively furthering the project's mission statement, and to the projects building on the protocol who are paying fees over time.

I'm very eager to see more reserved token allocation proposals over the next several months, and for the number of reserved token receivers to grow substantially.


The reserved rate also makes a 51% takeover very expensive. JuiceboxDAO currently has a total supply of 577,516,558 JBX tokens. Each ETH contributed mints another 544,320 JBX (353,808 to the payer, 190,512 to the reserved pool). In order for someone to mint 51% of tokens for themselves today, they would have to dump 3,865 ETH into the treasury. This will just get more expensive as time goes on since the total supply will increase over time as the number of tokens minted per ETH contributed decreases.